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IS ESCHEAT OF CORPORATION PROPERTY
"DUE PROCESS?"
The question whether the Constitution, section 192, and
Statutes of Kentucky, section 567, by the provisions of which
real property owned by a corporation for more than five years
without being used in its business escheats to the state is in con-
flict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
has never been decided by he Supreme Court of the United
States though the Kentucky Court of Appeals has decided it
in the negative. How would the Supreme Court decide the
question were it ever submitted to it? The Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids a state from taking property without due process
of law.
Let us examine the decisions of the Supreme Court to see
what due process means.
The Slaughter House cases' were the first in which it was
attempted to have the statute of a state declared invalid as vio-
lating to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Louisiana statute of
charter involved seems high handed. It gave to a new corpora-
tion chartered by it a monopoly of slaughtering and packing
animals in a territory of nearly twelve hundred square miles,
while existing slaughter houses were forbidden to -continue their
business. That the Supreme Court refused to interfere may
have been due to the fact that counsel for the old slaughter
house companies were not in earnest in their contention that
the statute was devoid of due process. For the court said:
"The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that the
defendant's charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due
process of law."
Their efforts were chiefly directed to showing that the char-
ter violated the Thirteenth Amendment. Justices Fields, Bradley
and Swayne dissented.
In Davidson v. New Orleans2 the court considered it wiser
not to define the words "due process," but to treat each case as
it would come before it on its own merits. Justice Bradley,
116 Wall. 36.
296 U. S. 97.
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in a separate opinion, held that a statute "if found to be arbi-
trary, oppressive and unjust may be declared to be not due
process of law." In Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith3 the
court held a statute invalid which compelled railroads to sell one
thousand mile tickets and prescribed too low a price therefor,
saying: "We say this particular piece of legislation does not
partake of the character of legislation fairly, necessary to attain
any of these objects." In Lawtoib v. Steele4 the court came still
nearer to defining what legislation is obnoxious to the amend-
ment in saying "that the means" must be "reasonably neces-
sary for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon indi-
viduals."
In French v. Barber Aspwl~t Paving Co.5 the court held
a special assessment for the making of a street valid, saying
that it would hold a statute as violating the amendment "only
when there is some abuse of law amounting to confiscation of
property or deprivation of personal rights." This language the
court cited again in Detroit v. Parker.6  In Lochner v. New
York7 the court held the statute of New York invalid, which
provided that employes in bakeries should not be required or
permitted to work more than sixty hours a week or ten hours
a day on the ground that it was not a legitimate exercise of the
police power, but an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the rights and liberty of an individual to
contract.
In Dobbins v. Los Angeles,8 where the city had first by
ordinance fixed the limits within which gasworks might be
erected but afterwards and after such work had been erected
passed another ordinance excluding the territory on which the
gasworks had been erected, the court held the second ordinance
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying that "property
rights can not be wrongfully destroyed by arbitrary enwact
ment." Where an anti-trust statute of Texas provided for pen-
alties of $5,000.00 per day and after a verdiot of guilty for
'173 U. S. 698.
'154 U. S. 133.
181 U. S. 324.
'181 U. S. 399.
7 198 U. S. 45.
' 195 U. S. 224.
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three hundred days so that the fine amounted to $1,600,000.00,
the court did not hold it unconstitutional, saying that it would
only interfere if the fines are "grossly excessive;" and that the
oil company had assets of over forty million; that the business
was extensive and profitable during the period while it violated
the statute and had declared dividends amounting to several
hundred per cent.)
In Ex parte Young'0 the statute prescribed freight and
passenger rates and declared the officers and agents, in case of
violation of the freight provisions guilty of misdemeanor, pun-
ishable with imprisonment for ninety days for each offense and
for disobedience to the passenger rate provision, guilty of felony,
punishable with a fine not exceeding $5,000.00 and imprisonment
for not exceeding five years, and the company itself liable to
immense fines. The court held the statute unconstitutional and
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, without regard to the
question of the insufficiency of the rates, because it provided
such enormous fines and imprisonment as result of any attempt
to test the validity of the law as must deter the company and
its officers from testing its validity in court.
In Shevlin Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota" the court refused
to interfere with a state statute which punished cutting timber
on state lands doubly in two separate proceedings, saying that
the legislation may be harsh but that the Supreme Court "can
not set aside legislation because it is harsh."
A statute of Alabama was attacked which allowed an in-
sured to recover from the company twenty-five per cent in ex-
cess of the loss suffered if the insurer belonged to any tariff
association of insurers regulating rates of premiums. The Su-
preme Court of the United States held that the state might in
order to prevent combinations among companies to prevent com-
petition lawfully provide for such recovery of twenty-five per
cent, and that the provision was germane to the object to be
obtained and that such additional recovery was not too arbitrary
to be enforced.12 The court held an Arkansas statute valid
9 Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 111.
a' 209 U. S. 148.
218 U. S. 67.
22 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307.
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which required that every train belonging to companies owning
roads of more than fifty miles long, carrying twenty-five cars
or more must have at least three brakemen finding it not too
arbitrary or unreasonable.' 3
In Chicago, Burlington & Q. R. B. v. McGuire " a state
statute was upheld which makes railroads liable to employes
through neglect of their agents and provides that no contract
of insurance, relief benefit or indemnity entered into prior to
the injury should be a bar to such liability, finding that the
provisions of the statute have a reasonable relation to a pur-
pose which it is competent for the government to effect and not
arbitrary.
In House v. Mayes15 the court held a state statute valid
which provided that at every sale of grain, &c., the actual weight
of the commodity should govern and no deduction made on
account of any rule of any board of trade, justifying such de-
duction and any purchaser who shall deduct any amount from
the actual weight by reason of any such rule shall be fined not
less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars for each of-
fense, holding that its provisions have a relation to the object
to be accomplished and "do not go beyond the necessities of the
case."
A California statute was held constitutional which after
the earthquake and fire in San Francisco provided for pro-
ceedings in court calling on all persons interested by publica-
tion to establish the title to land and for judgment declaring
the title to be in the persons who may have shown title to the
satisfaction of the court, the Supreme Court deciding that this
statute answering the necessities of the circumstances was not
so unreasonable and unjust as to impair or destroy fundamental
rights.16
In Noble S'tate Bank v. Hascel17 the statute subjected
state banks to assessments for a depositor's guaranty fund to
secure the prompt payment of deposits in all state banks. Out
of this fund the depositors of any insolvent state bank were to
C hicago B. 1. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453.
14219 U. S. 549.
219 U. S. 270.
"American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47.
lt 219 U. S. 104, 575.
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be paid and a lien was reserved upon the assets of the failing
bank to make good the sun so taken from the fund. The court
in refusing to declare the act unconstitutional says through
Justice Holmes that there is no definition possible of police power
or due process but "lines are pricked out by the gradual ap-
proach and contact of decisions on the op'posing sides," and
that the statute in question is "well within the state's constitu-
tional power, the credit of banks being a matter of public con-
cern and the banks being made to sustain each other's credit for
their mutual benefit. On the other hand an Arkansas statute
providing that railroad companies must pay claims for live stock
killed or injured within thirty days after notice, and their fail-
ure to do so should entitle the owner to double damages and
attorney's fees was held unconstitutional and denial of due
process,18 and in Oregon R. B. & N. Co. v. Fairchild'9 a statute
requiring certain railroads to make connection and transfers
between their almost parallel lines at great expense was held to
be taking property without due process of law. In the last
mentioned case Justice Lamar considered the demand on the
railroads as unreasonable and the public, necessitly not sch
as to justify the taking of property from the companies, as it
was not shown in the record what, if any, business would be
routed over these connections or what saving would come to the
public if they were constructed.
A Virginia statute and ordinance of a city based on it,
which authorized city councils to prescribe building lines in
particular districts on blocks, at the request of owners of two-
thirds of the property abutting on the block, and that no build-
ings should be erected within the line prescribed by such ordi-
nance on penalty of a fine, was held to be taking the property
of owners of the remaining third of the property without due
process, because the ordinance did not even assure a uniform
line on the whole street, but made "staggering street lines" pos-
sible.2 0 "Part of the property owners on the block determine
the extent of use that the owners shall make of their lots."
,1 St. Louis I. & M. S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354.
19 224 U. S. 510.
"Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137.
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This Justice McKenna said is the vice of the ordinance and
makes it an "unreasonable exercise of the police power."
A statute of Louisiana which created a rebuttal presump-
tion that any person systematically buying sugar in that state
for a less price than he pays in any other state is a party to a
monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade (evidently in-
tended to obstruct the American Sugar Refining Co). was held
unconstitutional as taking property without due process.2 ' The
right of a legislature to change the burden of proof was recog-
nized by Justice Holmes in his opinion, but he said that this
right has limits, that there must be some rational connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate facts presumed and
that the inference of one fact from proof of another must not
be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.
A statute of Arkansas which punished a telephone com-
pany $100.00 per day for refusing to render service to a sub-
scriber who is delinquent on past dues without payment in ad-
vance, was held as taking property without due process, because
the rule of the company was considered reasonable."
The case of Security Savings Bank v. Californic23 seems
at first blush to be an escheat case. The statute required the
banks to publish the names of the depositors and the balance
standing to their credit after the lapse of ten years after they
have ceased to deposit or draw at the end of every year and at
the end of twenty years after they have ceased to make de-
posits or to draw, to pay their balance over to the state, which
by proceedings of which the depositors were notified by pub-
lication would obtain a judgment escheating such balance. The
state sued the bank to enforce the payment to it of balances
which had remained not called for for ten years, making the
depositors parties, giving notice of the pendency of the pro-
ceedings by publication and asked for a judgment escheating
the balance. The bank claimed that the proceeding by publi-
cation only was not due process, but the Supreme Court held
that under the circumstances notice by publication was reason-
able and therefore due process; that the bank was bound to
2McFarland v. American Sugar Re1. Co., 241 U. S. 79.
S outhwestern Telephone Co. v. Donahu, 238 U. S. 482.
263 U. S. 282.
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pay the balances to the state as a new depository and that it was
a matter between the state and the depositors merely whether
the judgment of escheat was valid as against the depositors.
In Terrance v. Thompson24 the court had before it a Wash-
ington statute which disqualifies aliens who have not declared
their intention to become citizens of the United States from hold-
ing interests in land and provides that upon making such pro-
hibited conveyance the land shall be forfeited to the state; and
it was claimed by persons desiring to lease land to a Japanese
that the statute offended against the Fourteenth Amendment,
but as the argument of counsel shows the point was made only
on the ground that the act is in effect "a prohibition of the
right of an alien to engage in one of the common occupations
of life" and an inhibition against the use of the owner's land
for purposes which were legitimate when he acquired it. This
case and its companion cases of Webb v. O'Brien, Porterfield
v. Webb and Frick v. Webb, in the same volume, do not in-
volve the validity of an escheat of land by the state.
This is a review of such of the decisions as seem to throw
light on what is due process. To review all would make this
article too lengthy.
it seems from this "pricking out" of the road that the
Supreme Court is most unwilling to declare a statute of a state
unconstitutional and that a combination of certain obnoxious
features must exist to compel the court to do so. A "harsh"
punishment will not appeal to the court. Nothing short of con-
fiscation will be likely to suffice. There must be a public neces-
sity which makes confiscation the only available remedy for the
evil legislated against. The taking must be reasonable. If there
is no reasonable relation between the offense and the taking, if
the offense could be as well abated in other ways as by confis-
cation the confiscation will appear not due process. There must
be a disproportion between the offense and the punishment
and the punishment must be unduly oppressive and unreason-
able.
All these elements however seem to combine in our escheat
law. There is confiscation of the property-a taking of the
property from the owner and appropriation by the state with-
- 263 U. S. 107, 200.
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out compensation. Is the confiscation necessary to abate the
evil of the ownership of property by the corporation for more
than five years without being used in the business of the cor-
poration or are there remedies just as effective short of con-
fiscation? It appears that there are remedies just as effective
and less oppressive. The Supreme Court of California, in
People v. Stockton Savings & Loan Society,25 has pointed out
two ways in which the policy of the state can be carried out
without confiscation. The one is to enforce a public sale of the
property, turning over the proceeds after payment of the costs
and a compensation to the Attorney General to the corporation
or its stockholders, as is done in Illinois under chapter 32 of
the revised statute on corporations, and under a similar Texas
statute. Such a proceeding would resemble that provided for
by the statute of West Virginia, passed upon in King v. MuZ-
lins. 2G There lands were forfeited for non-payment of taxes,
but there was to be a forced sale of the land forfeited and the
balance of proceeds after payment of taxes, penalties and costs,
paid to the owner. This course would be more in harmony with
what the court said in Lake Shore & Mich. S. By. Co. v. Smith, 27
supra, where a statute compelling the railroad to issue thou-
sand mile tickets at an unreasonably low rate was condemned.
The attorney for the state had argued that the Legislature had
power to absolutely repeal the charter of the company and thus
terminate its existence. The court said:
"To terminate the charter and thus end the legal life of the com-
pany does not take away its property, but on the contrary leaves it to
all the shareholders of the company after payment of its debts."
The other method suggested by the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia is the forfeiture of the franchise of the offending cor-
poration which would bring about the sale of its assets, inolud-
ing the land for distribution among its stockholders.
The most convincing proof that the remedy of confiscation
is not necessary, but oppressive and not in conformity to the
settled maxim of free government is that of forty-eight states of
the union, most of whom condemn the holding of property by
"133 Cal. 612.
"171 U. S. 404.
" 173 U. S. 684.
L. J.-4
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corporations not used in their business, longer than six, ten,
fifteen and a few five years; there are only two Kentucky and
M ississippi 28 whiqA have provided for the confiscation or es-
cheat of the property after thq elapse of that period. The stat-
ute is also unreasonable because it provides the same oppressive
punishment no matter what may be the reason why, nor the
circumstances under which the company may have held the
property for more than five years, whether oversight or the
intervention of a period of commercial panic or depression dur-
ing which the property could not be sold at all or only at ruin-
ous prices, or because the property could not be sold, except
after the expenditure for repairs or betterments which the cor-
poration is not able to make during the period allowed. It is
unreasonable because it may follow upon a holding over for
one day or years before the period allowed, and it is unreason-
able because if it is supposed to be a punishment for recalci-
trancy it punishes to the tune of $100.00 or $2,500.00, as may
be the value of the property, though the defiance of the law
is the same in both .ases.
I think these reflections ought to prove that this statute is
not due process of law, but they do not assure a decision of the
Supreme Court to That effect.
0. A. WEHI,
Attorney-at-law.
Louisville, Ky.
21 Sec. 903 of the Code of 1906..
